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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
Respondent, the State of Utah, argues that Appellants were not 
personally served with the admittedly defective subpoenas and 
therefore, regardless of the methods employed to obtain the 
evidence used against them, they should not be allowed to complain. 
This argument ignores Appellants' rights to due process and 
fundamental fairness in the gathering and use of evidence by the 
State. It also ignores the constitutional abuses in this case 
which have been previously recognized by this Court, and which, if 
allowed to go uncorrected, would deny Appellants their rights to 
uniform operation of the law. Finally, the State fails to 
recognize the infirmities in both the ruling of the trial court and 
the reasoning of the Court of Appeals which necessitate reversal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
APPELLANTS HAVE STANDING TO RAISE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS 
A. DUE PROCESS 
Contrary to Respondent's assertions at page 17 of its brief, 
a finding of a violation of Appellants' rights to due process is 
not dependent on whether they received defective subpoenas. 
Article I, § 7 of the Utah Constitution provides "no person shall 
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law. •• This language echoes the guarantees of the fifth and 
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. The State 
seeks to deprive Appellants of their liberty. Therefore, 
Appellants clearly have standing to challenge the actions of the 
State on the ground that those actions, from the initiation of the 
investigation through the trial and subsequent appeal, denied them 
their fundamental rights of due process. 
The interest sought to be protected by the fairness standard 
of the due process clause is an evidentiary interest. Stovall v. 
Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); State v. Edwards, 109 Idaho App. 501, 
708 P.2d 906 (1985). The fundamental principles of fairness 
embodied by due process apply to the procedures used by the State 
in obtaining evidence. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); 
People v. Ellis, 55 Cal. Rptr. 358, 421 P.2d 393 (1966). Admission 
of evidence seized in violation of constitutional standards 
violates due process. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1960); State v. 
Hull, 158 Mont. 6, 487 P.2d 1314 (1971). 
When the State seeks to deprive a person of life, liberty, or 
property, the Constitution requires that the State's actions be 
guided not merely by technical requirements, but by the concept of 
fundamental fairness. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 99, 113 
(1976); Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983). The 
individual time, place, and circumstances of the case must be 
examined to determine if the State's actions in investigating and 
prosecuting the offense are consistent with the concepts of 
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fundamental fairness which form the foundation of our notion of 
due process. See Rupp v. Grantsville City, 610 P.2d 338 (Utah 
1980); Trade Comm'n v. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc., 21 Utah 2d. 431, 
446 P.2d 958 (1968). 
As previously pointed out, the investigation in the instant 
case was fatally flawed from its inception. Judge Bunnell, in his 
Memorandum Decision, indicates some of the abuses which occurred 
during the investigation. This Court, in In the Matter of a 
Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633 (Utah 1988) [hereinafter 
"Investigation"] has acknowledged the Constitutional violations 
that occurred in the investigation: "as the attorney general 
concedes, the Subpoena Powers Act was improperly applied. . . ." 
Id. at 658. 
The Attorney General, in his Brief, ignores these abuses as 
if they should be given no further consideration even though nearly 
all of the evidence submitted at trial was obtained through 
unconstitutional means. Each subpoena misstated that it was issued 
by the District Court and that disobedience could be summarily 
punished by contempt. Investigation, 754 P.2d at 658-59. Thus, 
all of the evidence gathered in response to these Subpoenas was 
gathered in a manner which unduly coerced the recipient to supply 
the information in violation of their rights. This was compounded 
by the fact, noted by Judge Bunnell, that many of the subpoenas 
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were extremely overbroad and exceeded the scope of the good cause 
affidavit. (See Judge Bunnell's Memorandum Decision, Appellant's 
Brief, Appendix page 4.) Thus, much of the information gathered 
in the course of the investigation was beyond the scope of what 
would have been lawfully obtainable through valid subpoenas. "It 
is contrary to the first principles of justice to allow a search 
through all [Defendants'] records, relevant or irrelevant in the 
hope that something will turn up." Federal Trade Comm'n v. 
American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 306 (1923). This is precisely 
the manner in which the investigation of the instant case was 
conducted. 
The State continued to conduct the investigation in the same 
unconstitutional fashion, even after criminal charges had been 
brought. Investigation. 754 P.2d at 638. This violates the rule, 
firmly established in grand jury proceedings, that once an 
indictment has been handed down, the prosecution cannot use grand 
jury investigative powers to secure additional evidence. See In 
re Grand Jury Proceedings, 632 F.2d 1033, 1041 (3d Cir. 1980); 
United States v. Fisher, 455 F.2d 1101, 1104-05 (2d Cir. 1972). 
This rule should apply with equal or greater force when the 
Subpoena Powers Act is involved since this Act lacks the 
protections inherent in the grand jury process. See Investigation, 
754 P.2d at 658. 
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This Court has previously considered the proper function of 
the Subpoena Powers Act in determining what procedural safeguards 
were necessary to meet due process requirements. Investigation, 
754 P.2d at 652. The requirements that this Court placed on the 
Subpoena Powers Act in that case were based on the use of the Act 
as a preliminary investigative tool. Id. 
In the instant case, the requirements that the Court imposed 
for proper use of the Act as a preliminary investigative tool were 
not met. Id. at 658-659. Also, the investigation continued in the 
same unconstitutional manner following the filing of formal 
criminal charges. After filing, Appellants were entitled not only 
to the protections imposed on preliminary investigations, but to 
the "full procedural safeguards appropriate in adjudicative or 
accusative proceedings." Id. Appellants were denied the 
procedural safeguards inherent in the guarantee of due process of 
law both before and after charges were brought. 
This error was compounded when the trial court shifted the 
burden to Appellants of proving a substantial violation of their 
rights and lack of good faith during the suppression hearing. Due 
process of law requires that the State, in order to convict a 
citizen of a crime, must carry the burden of proof. When the State 
impermissibly shifts the burden to the defendant, the result is a 
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denial of due process. See State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 
1987). 
The three due process violations outlined above; the failure 
to provide required procedural safeguards during the 
investigation, the continuation of the investigation in the same 
manner following the filing of criminal charges, and the 
impermissible shifting of the burden of proof to the Appellants at 
the suppression hearing, allowed the State to gain, by 
unconstitutional means, unfair advantage in the litigation. 
There can be no question that Appellants were prejudiced by 
the State's use of information obtained through overbroad and 
impermissibly coercive subpoenas. It is undisputed that all, or 
nearly all, of the evidence introduced at trial was obtained 
through the use of these subpoenas. (Transcript of suppression 
hearing, page 5; Appendix page 1). Where an accused can 
demonstrate prejudice resulting from the State's misconduct, he is 
entitled to a dismissal of charges based on a denial of due 
process. State v. Edmonson, 113 Idaho 230, 743 P.2d 459 (1987). 
See also State v. Lewis, 107 N.M. App. 182, 754 P.2d 853 (1988) 
(where the state obtains a tactical advantage over the accused 
through violation of due process, dismissal is required). 
In the face of the unconstitutional conduct of the 
investigation and the failure to suppress the evidence at trial 
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due to the application of an unconstitutional statute, the 
fundamental principles of fairness embodied by the concepts of due 
process demand that Appellants' convictions be reversed. 
B. EQUAL PROTECTION 
Respondent at page 19 of its Brief acknowledges that the 
State's failure to disclose the good cause affidavit and the 
overbroad application of the secrecy provisions of the Subpoena 
Powers Act create "legitimate concerns." However, Respondent 
contends that these violations "raise no legitimate issue as to the 
rights of persons not subpoenaed." Id. 
Appellants contend that the persons entitled to "uniform 
operation of laws" as guaranteed by Article I, Section 24 of the 
Utah Constitution are those persons against whom the State seeks 
to apply the law. In the case of the Subpoena Powers Act, Utah 
Code Annotated, § 77-22-1 et seq. (1982), the persons against whom 
the law is applied are the targets of the investigation. The 
protection inherent in Article I, Section 24, requires uniform 
operation of the laws from the moment the statute is used to 
instigate an investigation. The requirements of uniform operation 
apply to all those affected by the operation of the law, especially 
the target of the investigation. This is true, regardless of 
whether or not the target of the investigation is personally served 
with a subpoena. 
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Respondent offers no rationale to support its assertion that 
the Court must extend to the target the right to notice of 
subpoenas given to "the target's banker, accountant, business 
associates, friends, relatives, etc., etc., etc., . . ."in order 
for Appellants to have their equal protection claim recognized. 
Clearly, if the court imposed such a notice requirement, Appellants 
would be entitled to its "uniform application." However, this does 
not mean that Appellants are any less entitled to have "uniform 
application" of the requirements previously imposed by this court 
in In the Matter of a Criminal Investigation. 
The State, in this case, applied the Subpoena Powers Act in 
a manner which this Court has recognized as unconstitutional. If 
applied in the same manner in future cases, the investigation would 
be subject to dismissal and the evidence gathered would be 
suppressed; otherwise, the safeguards provided in In the Matter of 
a Criminal Investigation would be meaningless. 
There is no justification for allowing the Subpoena Powers Act 
to be applied to Appellants in a manner this Court has found 
impermissible. Article I, Section 24 requires uniform application 
of the laws of this State. Allowing the State to conduct an 
investigation targeted at Appellants in an unconstitutional manner 
denies them this right. 
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C. SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
1. Recognition of a Right of Privacy Under the State 
Constitution, 
The State argues that seizure of Appellants' "papers" 
including bank records, business records, records in the hands of 
their accountants, employees or associates did not violate their 
rights since the papers were in the hands of third parties when 
seized. In support Respondent cites cases which hold that a person 
has no "expectation of privacy" in records kept by his bank. 
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
Respondent's argument ignores Appellants' rights asserted 
independently under the Utah State Constitution. Article I, § 14 
of the Utah Constitution provides that "the right of the people to 
be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated . . . ." 
Under the reasoning advanced by Respondent, a person's papers and 
effects are not entitled to any protection from unreasonable 
searches and seizures unless those papers and effects are in the 
person's home or physical possession. 
If this were the intent of the framers of the Utah 
Constitution, the use of the terms "papers and effects" is 
redundant. Having already afforded rights to security in "persons 
and houses" no additional rights would be created by use of the 
terms "papers and effects," if those papers and effects are only 
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to be secure if located on a "person" or in his "house." By adding 
the terms "papers and effects," the framers of the Utah 
Constitution recognized that our rights extend beyond the borders 
of our property to include certain papers and effects in which we 
have an expectation of privacy, regardless of their physical 
location. 
California has recognized this right of privacy under the 
provisions of its State Constitution. Burrows v. Superior Court, 
118 Cal. Rptr. 165, 529 P.2d 590 (1974). This right is not limited 
to bank records, but extends to other private papers such as credit 
card receipts and telephone registers. People v. Blair, 159 Cal. 
Rptr. 818, 602 P.2d 738 (1979). Other States have followed this 
lead and recognized, under the provisions of their State 
Constitutions, a right of privacy1 in papers and records in the 
hands of a third party. See Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel 
Wagering, 477 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 1985); People v. Jackson, 116 111. 
App. 3d 430, 452 N.E.2d 85 (1983); Benson v. People 703 P.2d 1277 
(Colo. 1985); Charnes v. DiGiacomo, 200 Colo. 94, 612 P.2d 1117 
(1980); Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 403 A.2d 1283 (Pa. 1979). 
xIn State v. Thompson, 745 P.2d 1087 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987), 
the Idaho Court of Appeals gives a well-reasoned review of the 
rationale supporting the extension of a privacy interest under the 
State Constitutions to cover areas left unprotected by Federal 
common law. The Thompson court found that a telephone pen 
register constituted a "search" under the Idaho Constitution. 
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Attorneys, health care providers, accountants, bankers, and 
real estate agents, all recognize that information entrusted to 
them may be confidential in nature. The disclosure of such 
information without notice can be both a breach of their clients' 
trust and confidence, as well as a breach of a legal or ethical 
duty. Courts have recognized the sensitive nature of many business 
records by issuing protective orders preventing disclosure of such 
information revealed during the course of depositions or discovery. 
Therefore, a person's reliance on the privacy of papers, records 
or documents in the hands of a third party is not something new, 
novel, or foreign to the manner in which citizens conduct their 
affairs. The recognition of a limited right of privacy in certain 
important records, papers and documents held by third persons would 
merely confirm the expectation already held by our citizens that 
such records will be held confidential. 
Recognizing such a right will not unduly burden the State in 
the investigation and prosecution of offenses. The information is 
subject to discovery through the use of valid investigative 
subpoenas or the execution of warrants issued on probable cause. 
2. The Evidence Admitted as "Fruit of the Poisonous Tree." 
When the Defendant can show that a substantial portion of the 
seized documents are tainted, the government has the burden of 
establishing which documents are free from the taint and therefore 
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admissible. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 183 (1968); 
United States v. Finucan, 708 F.2d 838 (1st Cir. 1983). In the 
instant case it has previously been determined that the overbroad 
application of the secrecy order, the representations that the 
subpoenas were issued by the District Court and summarily 
punishable by contempt, and the failure to notify the recipients 
of the subpoenas of the general nature and scope of the 
investigation violated the recipients' rights of self incrimination 
and constituted unreasonable searches. Investigation, 754 P.2d at 
658-59. 
Because of the secret manner in which the investigation was 
carried out it is not possible to reconstruct in precise detail the 
chain of discovery for each piece of information or testimony 
obtained through the use of invalid subpoenas. Neither the 
subpoenas themselves nor the complete record of the investigation 
are contained in the record on Appeal. However, the record does 
reveal that the trial took in excess of two weeks, covering over 
1500 pages of transcript. Fifty-nine witnesses were called and the 
State presented approximately 174 exhibits. R-687-698. The 
incremental nature of the investigation is clear from the evidence 
presented, each round of subpoenas expanding on and following the 
leads provided by the information discovered through prior 
subpoenas and depositions. 
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In United States v. Tane, 329 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1964), the 
government illegally taped a conversation between Leo Guzik, a 
lawyer for Pase Motors, and Sam Goldstein, president of Union Local 
239. When Wesley Pase was confronted with the illegally taped 
conversation, he implicated the Defendant Tane. The District Court 
dismissed the indictment on the grounds that Pase's testimony was 
the product of a illegal wire tap and therefore inadmissible as 
"fruits of the poisonous tree." The Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals affirmed the lower Court's ruling holding that Tane had 
standing to challenge the admissibility of the evidence and 
sustained dismissal of the charges. That case and those which have 
followed it stand for the proposition that testimony of a witness 
uncovered through unconstitutional searches is inadmissible as 
"fruits of the poisonous tree." See United States v. Karathanos, 
531 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1976); Williams v. United States, 382 F.2d 48 
(5th Cir. 1967). 
In the instant case the State does not dispute that all or 
nearly all of the evidence and testimony presented at trial was a 
direct or indirect result of the infirm subpoenas issued as part 
of the criminal investigation conducted in Emery County. (See 
Suppression Transcript Hearing Page 5: Appendix Page 1; see also 
Investigation. 754 P.2d at 658) The State makes no attempt in its 
brief to justify the admission of evidence under an exception to 
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the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine.2 The Defendant has 
demonstrated that all or nearly all the evidence is tainted by the 
State's unconstitutional conduct during the investigation. The 
State has failed to meet its burden of showing that any of the 
evidence introduced at trial is free of the taint of the invalid 
subpoenas which lead to its discovery. Therefore the evidence need 
be suppressed as "fruits of the poisonous tree." 
II. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING 
The Court of Appeals rejected Respondent's arguments regarding 
standing finding that, "Defendant's claims to an expectation of 
privacy are rights protected by the Fourth Amendment." State v. 
Thompson. 751 P.2d 807, 809 (Utah App. 1988) (citing Rakas v. 
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978)). The Court of Appeals recognized 
that the trial court's rationale in failing to suppress the 
evidence at trial was invalid. .Id. However, it upheld the trial 
court's ruling claiming independent reliance on Illionis v. Krull, 
480 U.S. 340 (1987). 
2Compare United States v. Namer, 835 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 
1988), where the Court found that infirm warrants seeking business 
records revealed the names of key witnesses; however, the 
government met its burden of showing that it also obtained the 
names from an independent source, free of the taint of the invalid 
subpoenas. 
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As outlined in Appellant's brief, the Court of Appeals 
reliance on Krull is misplaced (See Appellant's brief pp. 21-33). 
Krull does not apply where the statute relied upon is found to be 
constitutional. It does not apply where, as here, exclusion of 
the evidence would have a deterrent effect upon the violation of 
individual rights. It does not apply where, as here, there is no 
good faith reliance on the statutory language. Application of the 
principles espoused in Krull to violations of rights created by our 
State Constitution is prevented by the mandatory and prohibitory 
language of Article I, § 26 of the Utah Constitution. Krull deals 
only with violations of the Fourth Amendment. Reliance on Krull 
does not and cannot sustain the trial court's ruling given the 
violations of due process and equal protection established by 
Appellants. 
Respondent does not attempt to support the Court of Appeals' 
reliance on Krull, nor does it offer an alterative rationale upon 
which this Court could rely. In the absence of any supporting 
rationale the ruling of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's grounds for denying Appellants' Motion to 
Suppress have been held unconstitutional by this Court. State v. 
Thompson. 751 P.2d at 809; State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 
1987). The actions of the State in gathering that evidence have 
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also been held unconstitutional. In the Matter of a Criminal 
Investigation. 754 P.2d at 658. The Court of Appeals' reliance on 
Illinois v. Krull, as an independent basis for the admission of the 
evidence, is misplaced. 
Appellants have demonstrated that their rights to due process 
were denied in the manner in which the State obtained the evidence 
used against them and in the standards used to determine the 
admissibility of the evidence at trial. Appellants have also 
demonstrated that allowing the Subpoena Powers Act to be applied 
to them in this manner denies them "uniform operation" of the laws 
of this State. 
Wherefore, Appellants respectfully request that this Court 
reverse the rulings of the lower court and order that all evidence 
and testimony submitted at trial which were the products of the 
criminal investigation conducted under the Subpoena Powers Act be 
suppressed. 
Respectfully submitted this day of July, 1989. 
SESSIONS & MOORE 
JOHN F. CLARK 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
PLAINTIFF, ) 
-VS- ) 
L. BRENT FLETCHER, MICHAEL C.) 
THOMPSON, BRUCE A. CONKLIN, 
AND MICHAEL ZIEMSKI, ) 
DEFENDANTS. ) 
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BE IT REMEMBERED THAT ON THE 27TH DAY OF 
DECEMBER, 1984, COMMENCING AT THE HOUR OF 4:15 O'CLOCK P.M., 
THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER CAME ON FOR HEARING IN THE 
COURTROOM OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR SALT 
LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH; SAID CAUSE BEING HELD BY THE 
HONORABLE JUDITH M. BILLINGS, JUDGE IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH. ,.. «,
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 ' STATING THAT THIS IS SOMETHING THAT'S NOT WITHIN MY JURIS-
2
 | DICTION AND HE VIEWED THE SUPPRESSION ISSUE AS BEING BEYOND 
THE SCOPE OF HIS AUTHORITY, BUT OBVIOUSLY, HE DID BELIEVE 
THAT THE ISSUANCE OF THE AUTHORITY AND THE CONSTITUTION-
ALITY OF THAT AUTHORITY TO BE SOMETHING WITHIN HIS JURIS-
DICTION, WHICH IT CLEARLY WAS. I MEAN, IT WAS, AFTER ALL, 
HIS AUTHORITY THAT THOSE SUBPOENAS WERE ISSUED AND THE 
SUBPOENAS GENERATED ALMOST ALL OF THE EVIDENCE AGAINST US 
AND MR. FLETCHER WERE ISSUED UPON HIS AUTHORITY. AND THERE 
IS NO QUESTION ABOUT THAT. 
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 I PURSUANT TO THIS COURT'S DIRECTION WE HAVE 
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 I RECEIVED THE SUBPOENAS AND IT'S CLEAR THAT, AS TO THE DOCU-
MENTARY EVIDENCE AT LEAST, THAT ALMOST ALL OF IT, IF NOT 
MAYBE ALL OF IT BUT AS FAR AS I CAN TELL ALMOST ALL OF IT 
IF NOT ALL OF IT, WAS OBTAINED THROUGH THAT PROCESS. 
JUDGE BILLINGS: I'LL TELL YOU WHAT I'M HAVING 
TROUBLE WITH, AND MAYBE YOU CAN HELP ME, IS HOW THAT IS 
THE LAW OF THIS CASE WHEN THIS CASE WASN'T EVEN FILED WHEN 
THAT OCCURRED AND WHEN HE RULED THAT, BUT RATHER, AS A WHOLE 
DIFFERENT CASE UNDER A DIFFERENT ACT WHICH MAY, YOU KNOW, 
LEAD TO THIS CASE, BUT I'M HAVING TROUBLE WITH WHY IT'S 
NOT LIKE JUDGE DANIELS' RULES THE D.U.I. LAW UNCONSTITU-
TIONAL IN ONE CASE AND I HAVE THE EXACT SAME FACTS IN 
ANOTHER CASE AND I SAY NO, IT'S NOT. 
MR. WHEELER: I THINK THAT SOME OF WHAT HE DID 
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